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Abstract
This article will explain why Russia annexed Crimea and is destabilizing eastern Ukraine. To do this, 
three different theoretical approaches on various levels of analysis will be used. It will be examined 
how far the expansion of NATO, as well as that of the European Union (Theory of Neorealism), was 
a motive for Russia’s action. NATO’s enlargement is analysed predominantly. In addition, political-
psychological motivations of the Russian leadership are considered. But it is also analysed whether 
Russia’s pure power interests have played a role (Theory of Realism). The focus here is on the 
Russian naval base in Crimea. It is necessary to examine whether preserving its fleet in the Black 
Sea was a motive for Moscow to annex the Crimean peninsula.
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Introduction and current state of research
“Unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions have not resolved any 
problems. […] [T]hey have caused new human tragedies and created 
new centers of tension” (Putin 2007). The Russian course of action in 
eastern Ukraine and in the Crimean peninsula, since spring 2014, seems 
to comply with this “unilateral,” “illegitimate” manner (Engelberg 2016: 
61; McFaul 2014: 170), whereby Vladimir Putin, back in 2007, criticized the 
“unipolar” US world order as “not only unacceptable but also impossible 
in today’s world” (Putin 2007; Ehlers 2014: 26).
This article tries to explain Russian behaviour in the course of the Ukrainian 
crisis. Russia transformed “eastern Ukraine into a permanent trouble spot” 
(Portnov 2014: 8) – the area around “Donezk and Luhansk” (Ehrhart 2014: 
28) – as well as previously annexing the “Crimean peninsula in the Black 
Sea” (Portnov 2014: 6).1 Thus it was Russia that “unleashed” the Ukrainian 
crisis (Maćków 2015: 11, 17). However: Why did Russia annex Crimea and 
why is it still destabilizing eastern Ukraine? This research question guides 
this article and has to be answered. Answering the question seems to 
be relevant for clarifying whether further steps of this kind have to be 
expected from Russia (Treisman 2016: 47). Because the Russian state “is 
usually equated with the president” (Maćków 2015: 63), I use (among 
others) speeches made by Russian President Putin, before and within the 
Ukrainian crisis, as primary sources.
The research literature has already pointed out possible explanations for 
Russia’s behaviour: Jerzy Maćków (2015: 18) understands the Ukrainian crisis 
“as a permanent conflict of European cultural and political worlds,” which 
became “acute in 2014,” though the conflict has “become historical”. For 
John J. Mearsheimer2 the Ukrainian crisis is thus far – especially in the opinion 
of the West – a result of the aggressive Russian behaviour (Mearsheimer 
2014: 77). However, this is a miscalculation, because he has the following 
thesis: “[T]he United States and its European allies share most of the 
responsibility for the crisis” (ibid.). More precisely, three developments are 
1 An end to this destabilization by Russia, even within 2017, and beyond, is not to be expected (Beddoes 2016: 13).
2 Mearsheimer ranks as an exponent of neorealism or structural realism (Schörnig 2010: 65).
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relevant: NATO expansion, as the “taproot of the trouble,” the expansion 
of the European Union in eastern Europe, and “the West’s backing of the 
pro-democracy movement in Ukraine” (ibid.). By annexing Crimea, Putin 
did not implement a long-planned strategy, argues Mearsheimer, but 
rather it was “a spontaneous reaction to Yanukovich’s ousting” (ibid.: 85). 
Likewise, Daniel Treisman has doubts about a long-time-planned strategy 
of Putin, which illustrates “the chaotic manner” of Russia’s course of action 
in Crimea (Treisman 2016: 48). Treisman traces Russian behavior in the 
Ukraine to two other possibilities: the imperialistic ambitions of Putin within 
the post-Soviet area and “a hastily conceived response to the unforeseen 
fall of […] Yanukovich” (ibid.: 2016: 47). The Russian action in Crimea also 
depends on its Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol, which has great significance 
for Russia (ibid.: 50). Vittorio Hösle does not interpret Russia’s action “as 
a spontaneous reaction,” because Hösle assumes that “schemes for 
annexation of Ukrainian territory” have already existed “for a long time” 
(Hösle 2015: 106). Hösle emphasizes domestic challenges, which forced 
Putin to achieve “foreign policy successes” (ibid.: 107).
Michael McFaul also looks at the difficulties into which the Putin regime 
got in its own country, and therewith can the Russian action be explained 
(McFaul 2014: 169). Similarly, Stefan Meister reads the “legitimacy deficit 
of the Putin system” as the “main reason” for the intensifying “conflict 
between Russia and the West” (Meister 2015: 2). According to Wolfgang 
Zellner, the Ukrainian Maidan and the protests in Russia are a threat to 
“Putin’s system of rule” (Zellner 2015: 91). Analyzing Russia’s new military 
doctrine, Margarete Klein analogically recognizes the worry about a 
“´Maidan` scenario” existing in Russia (Klein 2015a: 4). Klaus von Beyme 
notices a transformation of the Russian “security concept […], from being 
based on NATO, to a rejection of Western institutions” (Beyme 2016: 43). 
Nadia Alexandrova-Arbatova calls the Ukrainian crisis “the first direct 
conflict between the differing regional strategies of Russia and the EU” 
(Alexandrova-Arbatova 2017: 13). Ukrainian membership of the EU, and 
NATO, seems to be unlikely (Ehrhart 2014: 30). Nevertheless, there has 
already been a “rapprochement” of Ukraine to these Western institutions, 
which still continues to move forward (ibid.).
The data basis for this work is profound. As the previously mentioned state 
of research suggests, the approach for the leading question could be quite 
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revealing if theoretical approaches on different levels of analysis are used.3 
That is why Russia’s behaviour will be analysed from multiple perspectives 
in section four, by using the following three theoretical approaches. First, 
the theory of realism by Hans Joachim Morgenthau (Morgenthau 1963), 
which focuses on the state as the prime level of analysis. Second, the 
theory of structural realism (also called neorealism) by Kenneth Waltz 
(Waltz 1979), looking at a systemic level of analysis, namely international 
politics. And third, a political-psychological theory will be used, written 
by Stavros Mentzos (Mentzos 1995), which concentrates on a human-
psychological dimension. The hypotheses, which are deduced from these 
three theories, will be verified in the empirical part of this work. In testing 
the hypotheses in the analytical part, the focus will be mainly on NATO’s 
expansion (Section 4.2.1.) as a possible explanation for Russian behaviour. 
Finally, the results of the analysis will be listed in the conclusion. But first of 
all, the issue must be described by collecting the most important facts.
Basic description of the issue  
Since the end of Cold War, the US has been a military hegemon (Müller 
2015: 309; Menzel 2016: 37; Nye 2017: 16).4 NATO has spread to the 
former Soviet sphere of influence and borders the Russian Federation 
(Giegerich 2012: 45–46). NATO’s missile defence system, agreed upon in 
2010 at the Lisbon summit and predominantly financed by the USA, has 
been “provisionally” ready for action since 2016 and will be completed 
in 2018 (Dickow et al. 2016: 1–2; NATO 2016a). Likewise, the European 
Union, simultaneously, accommodated new members from Eastern 
Europe (Wessels 2009: 960). In 2003, the European Neighbourhood 
Policy was established by the EU (Lippert 2014: 2), which Ukraine joined 
and “received the status of a neighboring state without membership 
prospects” (Bos 2010: 574; Maćków 2015: 108-110). Thus the West, used 
here in the sense of NATO and the EU states, is superior to Russia both in 
military and economic terms. Accordingly an imbalance of power can 
3 Cf. Kenneth Waltz’s three analytical levels (Krell 2009: 156); compare this also with the following statements.
4 The current global order must be seen as multipolar (Mazarr 2017: 25–32).
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be assumed to the disadvantage of Russia.5
In 2010, Russian President Medvedev and the President of Ukraine 
Yanukovich signed a contract about maintaining the Russian Black Sea 
fleet on Ukrainian territory for a further 25 years, with an option for a further 
5 years, provided “neither party chooses to terminate the agreement” 
(Kremlin 2010; Cross 2017: 45). In 2011 and 2012, a domestic crisis became 
manifest in Russia (Schröder 2012: 27–28). To the end of Medvedev’s 
term his approval rates declined6 and discontent in the population 
increased (ibid.: 27). Hence “the political elite manipulated in a number 
of the regions” the results of the Duma elections (ibid.).7 These “evident 
manipulations” led to “mass demonstrations” in the Russian capital and 
other cities (ibid.). Putin himself achieved in the following presidential 
elections (just) 63.6 percent8 (ibid.). At Putin´s inauguration there were, 
once more, (some huge) demonstrations (ibid.).
The immediate causes of the Ukraine crisis were “developments” in Ukraine 
itself (Maćków 2015: 11, 17): From the end of 2013 to the beginning of 2014, 
the Ukrainian population partly protested in the Ukrainian capital “and at 
other places in the country […], against the […] regime of President Viktor 
Yanukovich and for an association agreement with” the EU (Maćków 
2015: 16–17; Quiring 2014: 14). Previously, the Ukrainian government 
chose “not to sign” the agreement with the EU (Göler 2015: 300; Maćków 
2015: 86);9 before this, Russia put “massive pressure” on the Ukrainian 
governance (Göler 2015: 300; Maćków 2015: 86). The protests, also called 
“Euromajdan,” evolved into a “national movement” (Maćków 2015: 87). 
The use of force against the demonstrators culminated in “shooting” 
them (20–21 February);10 shortly afterwards the pro-Russian President 
Yanukovich fled (“unexpectedly”) “to Russia” (ibid.: 88–89). According 
5 In 2011, the GDP of the EU states (in million US dollars) was nearly ten times that of Russia’s; there is a similar  factor 
by comparing the military expenditures (in billion US dollars); GDP p.c. in Russia ranks at 10.119 US dollars, while that 
of the US is at 59.391 US dollars; the EU has about 3.5 times as many inhabitants as Russia  (Weidenfeld 2015: 205; The 
Economist 2016: 96, 99). Of course it is not the intention to create the impression that Europe and the US do not have 
weak points themselves (Niblett 2017: 19–21; 24).
6 Even Putin’s approval rates declined.
7 In 2012, the election results for the United Russia party were about 49.3 percent, yet in 2007 the party won 64.3 percent 
(Schröder 2012: 27).
8 In 2004, Putin reached 75.03 percent; in 2008, Medvedev obtained 70.28 percent (Schröder 2012: 27).
9 Until then the Ukrainian government tried, even while Yanukovich was president, “to work towards the agreement” 
(Göler 2015: 299). When the new government came to power, the agreement was signed on 27 June 2014 (Ehrhart 
2014: 30).
10  Within two days, 98 people were killed (Maćków 2015: 88).
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to Russian President Putin, this overthrow of Yanukovich was a “coup” 
(Putin 2014a). Russia moved on to a so-called “hybrid warfare,” where 
“military means” are combined with “nonmilitary ones” (Klein 2015b: 48). 
For this, Moscow used “regular Russian troops, which, however, acted as 
disguised ´separatists`” (Maćków 2015: 11). “Separatist movements” in 
eastern Ukraine were supported by Russia (Maćków 2015: 90–91; Portnov 
2014: 6). There, “the political conflict” evolved “into a war” (Portnov 2014: 
6; Maćków 2015: 11, 90–91). The annexation of Crimea to Russian territory 
succeeded only through the use of Russian soldiers (Maćków 2015: 90). In 
March 2014, “a referendum on Crimea” was held, “whereby the residents 
of the peninsula […] [would have] expressed their wish” – “more than 
96%” – “to unite with Russia” (Putin 2014b; Putin 2014a). On 18 March 2014, 
“Crimea and Sevastopol” were integrated “into the Russian Federation” 
(Eitelhuber 2015: 310). Officially Putin justified Russia’s behaviour by 
referring to history. Thus the “spiritual origins” of the Russian nation would 
come from Crimea (Putin 2014b).
Theoretical approach
Macht und Frieden. Grundlegung einer Theorie der internationalen Politik 
(Power and peace. Foundation of an international politics theory)
– Realism by Hans J. Morgenthau: theoretical foundations
The fundamental assumption of Hans J. Morgenthau’s theory is that 
politicians “think and act […] in terms of power, understood as interest” 
(Morgenthau 1963: 51). A politician has to analyse “what is possible in 
the concrete circumstances of time and place” and favourable “for 
the national power” (ibid.: 52, 73). Insofar as politics in the international 
system is “a struggle for power,” its “immediate aim is constantly power” 
(ibid.: 69, 74–77). The “military strength” of a state is “the most important 
material factor […] [of its] political power” (ibid.: 71). Further “elements of 
coincidence” also affect the foreign policy of a state (ibid.: 53). Politics is 
about maintenance of power, an increase of power or a demonstration 
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of power; at the international level, this results in “three typical forms of 
international politics”: a “policy of status quo,” an imperialistic policy or a 
policy of prestige (ibid.: 81).
Operationalization and derivation of the hypotheses
Now, hypotheses must be deduced from these theoretical basics. The 
hypotheses will be tested in the analytical part of this paper. Realism 
ascribes the foreign policy behaviour of a state (dependent variable) to 
its “interest understood in the sense of power” (independent variable). 
The current state of research already refers to a potential strategic 
importance of its naval base in the Black Sea to Russia (Treisman 2016: 50; 
Cross 2017: 44–46). By annexing Crimea, and with it also the port city of 
Sevastopol, Russia could follow an (international) “policy of status quo”. 
With the escape of the pro-Russian President Yanukovich, an “element 
of coincidence,” Russia could have feared a loss of its military base: To 
maintain its military power, Russia ought to have tried to preserve its naval 
base in Crimea (independent variable). This is on the assumption that the 
base is of particular strategic importance for Russia. With the overthrow of 
Yanukovich (intervening variable), Russia could have feared a termination 
of the contract for the continuity of the Russian naval base in Ukrainian 
territory (intervening variable), which would have meant a loss of the naval 
base. Therefore, Russia decided to annex Crimea (dependent variable). 
To test the hypothesis, this causal chain has to be verified empirically.11
H1: In order to maintain its naval base in the Black Sea, Russia annexed 
Crimea.
Theory of international politics
– Neorealism by Kenneth Waltz: theoretical foundations
According to Kenneth Waltz, “states” are “the units” in the international 
11 Cf. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Van Evera 1997).
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system and their “interactions” form the “structure” of the system (Waltz 
1979: 95). More precisely, that means that if the “distribution of capabilities” 
among the states changes, the structure of the system changes too 
(Waltz 1979: 97, 98). This structure in turn affects “the behavior of the 
states” (Schörnig 2010: 75; Waltz 1979: 92–93). The status of states in the 
international politics system depends on “all” of the states’ “capabilities” 
(Waltz 1979: 131): on the “population,” the size of a state’s territory, and 
on economic and military power (ibid.). The anarchic ordering principle 
of the international politics system, which is characterized by an absence 
of “agents with system-wide authority” (ibid.: 88–89), implies that states 
ascribe their “security” the highest priority (ibid.: 126). All such states, 
which cannot help themselves, “will fail to prosper, will lie […] open to 
dangers, will suffer” (ibid.: 118). Consequently, the states’ primary goal 
is to survive – it is their “ground of action in a world where the security of 
states is not assured” (ibid.: 91–92). To ensure their survival, all states strive 
for an enlargement of their means (ibid.: 118, 125). Only a balance in the 
distribution of these means among the states guarantees a high degree of 
security (Schörnig 2010: 74). In doing so, the states apply both “economic 
means for military and political ends” and “military and political means for 
the achievement of economic interests” (Waltz 1979: 94).
Operationalization and derivation of hypotheses
The theory of structural realism ascribes the states’ behaviour in the 
international system (dependent variable) to the structure of this system 
(independent variable). The distribution of power among the states affects 
the structure of the international system as well as the states’ status in 
the system. Because of the anarchy in the international system, all states 
must care for their security on their own. The states’ survival depends on 
the development of their means; on the other hand, this has an effect 
on the other states’ behaviour. These means include military, as well as 
economic, strength.
By expanding its institutions, NATO and the EU, the West extended its 
military, economic and political means and this resulted in an imbalance 
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of power.12 In the “anarchic” system of international politics, Russia could 
have reacted to the expansion of the Western sphere of influence and 
Moscow could have tried to guarantee its own security. With regard to 
NATO’s expansion, the state of research, mentioned in the introduction 
of this paper, refers to NATO’s eastward expansion, to NATO’s missile 
defence system (Eitelhuber 2015: 220) and a (possible) Ukrainian NATO 
membership. Russia ought to have reacted to NATO’s expansion, in terms 
of its eastward enlargement and its missile defence system (independent 
variable), as thereby Moscow saw its security endangered (intervening 
variable). This would have motivated Russia to prevent a further increase 
of the West’s military power, in the form of a NATO membership of the 
Ukraine (intervening variable), by annexing Crimea and (still) destabilizing 
eastern Ukraine (dependent variable). This causal chain must also be 
examined.
H2: By annexing Crimea and destabilizing eastern Ukraine, Russia reacted 
to NATO’s expansion.
As regards the expansion of the European Union, the EU eastern 
enlargement, the European Neighborhood Policy and a further 
rapprochement, in the form of an association agreement between the 
EU and Ukraine, must be examined.13 Russia ought to have reacted to 
the EU’s expansion, in terms of its eastward enlargement, to the European 
Neighborhood Policy and to the association agreement between the EU 
and Ukraine (independent variable), as because of this, Russia could have 
feared a weakening of its own economic and political sphere of influence 
(intervening variable). This must have motivated Russia to prevent a further 
increase of the West’s power, in the form of a rapprochement between 
the Ukraine and the EU (intervening variable), by annexing Crimea and 
(still) destabilizing eastern Ukraine (dependent variable). This causal chain 
also needs to be analysed, in order to test the hypothesis.
H3: By annexing Crimea and destabilizing eastern Ukraine, Russia reacted 
to the expansion of the EU.
12  This will be assumed as a given fact; cf. bullet point two.
13  Cf. the introduction of this paper.
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Pseudostabilisierung durch Nationalismus und Krieg (Pseudo stabilization 
by nationalism and war) – Political-psychological theory by Stavros 
Mentzos: Theoretical foundations
Stavros Mentzos explains that “national distinction and […] self-definition” 
are often created “through a degradation and humiliation of other nations” 
(Mentzos 1995: 71). It is the result of a “creation of an enemy stereotype 
and intolerance” regarding “all that is not [part] of the own nation” (ibid.: 
76). The “process of an enemy differentiation” “promotes the integration 
and the identity” and strengthens “the own inner cohesion” (ibid.: 74). At 
this creation of an enemy stereotype, “own inner conflicts” are fended off 
“projectively” (ibid.: 74): “Clashes of interests” of a “nation” and resultant 
“tensions” are “projected externally” (ibid.).14 Such a “creation of a we-
feeling” could be “imposed from top to bottom,” or can be achieved by 
“externalization of the conflicts,” therefore by “projecting to an actual 
existing or ad hoc created outer enemy” (ibid.: 75). If such a “pseudo-
stabilization” is missing, this can cause an “insecurity and confusion within 
the self-definition,” as the abrupt end of “the East-West conflict” illustrates, 
as well as the end of this particular “enemy stereotype” (ibid.: 73). The 
internal “integration” of a nation is thus acquired for a “stabilization of 
the conflict with an external enemy” (ibid.: 75). Or in other words: The 
“garbage [...] of the unsolved conflicts in reality gets disposed” “by 
externalization” (ibid. 1995: 76).
Operationalization and derivation of the hypothesis
The “self-definition” and an inner coherence of a nation (dependent 
variable) can be achieved by the “creation of an enemy image” 
(independent variable). By the end of the East-West conflict, Russia’s 
“pseudo-stabilization,” though, could have been lost. It seems possible 
that Putin wanted to blame the West for Russia’s “growing economic and 
political contradictions” (Ostrovsky 2016: 35), to cast the West as the villain 
in Russia’s domestic policy crisis. Consequently Putin would distract from 
14  Such “creations of an enemy stereotype” can also “result immediately in wars” (Mentzos 1995: 80).
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXIII (80) - 2017
269
his “vulnerability at home” with “foreign aggressions” (Beddoes 2016: 13).15
In the course of the obvious domestic crisis in Russia (in 2011 and 2012), 
the political leadership could have tried to externalize this crisis with the 
use of an enemy image, in order to whitewash the “internal tensions.” 
Assuming that Russia’s political leadership considered an externalization 
of domestic policy mischiefs necessary, they ought to have established 
an enemy stereotype of the West (independent variable), which should 
be fought against within the Ukraine (intervening variable). Therewith the 
Russian political leadership ought to have tried to reach an inner cohesion 
in Russia itself, in order to strengthen the legitimization of its regime 
domestically (intervening variable). As a result, Russia ought to have taken 
military action in Crimea and destabilized eastern Ukraine with the aid of 
troops (dependent variable).
H4: In order to strengthen its legitimization within Russia, the political 
leadership created an enemy image of the West, which must be fought 
against on Ukrainian territory.
Analysis
Russia: maintaining military power - the Russian 
Black Sea fleet in Crimea
The following section will analyse whether maintaining the Russian Black 
Sea fleet in Sevastopol and hence preserving its military power can 
possibly explain the Russian annexation of Crimea. It will be shown that 
Russia feared a termination of the contract on the maintenance of 
the Russian naval base on Ukrainian territory, because of Yanukovich’s 
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overthrow, and as a consequence annexed Crimea. For that, first, the 
assumption must be examined as to whether the naval base in Crimea is 
actually central to Russia. The Russian fleet in the Black Sea has “the worst 
strategic location” of the “four Russian fleets,”16 and is also relevant for 
NATO and the “Euro-Atlantic security” (Alexandrova-Arbatova 2017: 17, 
46). As early as 2003, Putin spoke about a “strategic interest” that the Black 
Sea region has for Russia: “The Black Sea gives Russia direct access to the 
world’s major transport routes, including its economic routes” (Kremlin/
Putin 2003). Also, after the “referendum” on Crimea, Putin emphasized 
several times in his speeches the importance of the port city of Sevastopol 
to Russia; Putin characterized this city as “the birthplace of the Russian 
Black Sea fleet” and as “the main base of the Black Sea fleet” (Putin 
2014a). In this sense, the port city of Sevastopol is both of military and of 
economic relevance to Russia’s power: “Sevastopol provides Russia ice-
free port access year round, and the means to project maritime and other 
military and commercial assets into the Balkans, the Mediterranean and 
the Middle East” (Cross 2017: 44). Admittedly Putin officially rationalized 
the annexation of Crimea by pointing to an interpretation of history (Putin 
2014b), and yet the war between Russia and Georgia in 2008 visualized 
the “new [military] relevance” of the Black Sea to Russia, “with clashes 
between the two states at sea” (Seidler 2015: 104). The fact that the 
Russian naval base in Crimea is of particular (military) importance for 
Russia has been shown.
The relation between NATO and Ukraine was always stressed because 
of “the Russian naval base in Crimea” (Seidler 2015: 218–219). Due to 
this cooperation, Russia assessed its naval base on Ukrainian territory as 
being “endangered” (ibid.: 266). Especially because of the overthrow 
of the pro-Russian President Yanukovich, it seemed to be possible that a 
new, Western-orientated government would “probably” speak against a 
Russian naval base on Ukrainian territory (Mearsheimer 2014: 77; Treisman 
2016: 48, 50). The treaty arranged in 2010 can be terminated by both 
sides, whereby Russia would have lost its “sole” naval base in the Black 
Sea (O’Hanlon/Petraeus 2016: 16). Having “control” over its Black Sea 
fleet and maintaining its naval base in Sevastopol seems to have been 
a crucial motive for annexing Crimea and the port city of Sevastopol, 
located therein (Cross 2017: 45). Thereby the conflict between Ukraine 
16 In the case of a “hypothetical” conflict with NATO (Alexandrova-Arbatova 2017: 17).
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and Russia can be mainly explained as follows: “Maintaining access to the 
port city of Sevastopol and the security of the Black Sea fleet constitute 
the primary strategic source of the current conflict between Ukraine and 
Russia” (ibid.: 46). Since Russia has planned to further enlarge its Black Sea 
fleet, the strategic importance of the naval base has become clearer. 
So a further increase of “80 new warships” is planned up to 2020 (ibid.). 
Although Stephen Sestanovich (2014: 172) sees no risk to the Russian naval 
base in Crimea, this analysis illustrates the opposite: By annexing Crimea 
and the city of Sevastopol, Russia seems to be preventing damage to its 
(military) power.17 It may be assumed that Russia has followed a policy of 
maintaining the status quo. Hypothesis H1 seems to be verified empirically.
Distribution of capabilities in the system of 
international politics
Western military dominance: expansion of NATO
Now it must be examined whether Russian behaviour can be explained by 
the West’s military gain in power, in this case the expansion of NATO. The 
Russian “forces” are, “in all categories [,] inferior to NATO” (Eitelhuber 2015: 
217). A military imbalance of power to the disadvantage of Russia may 
be taken for granted.18 NATO’s expansion seems to be aimed at pursuing 
power and the ensuing “consequences” for “non-NATO members” did 
attract some attention (Müller 2015: 311–312).
Whether Russia did regard NATO’s eastward expansion as a significant 
threat to its security must be analysed. For Putin, this expansion of NATO to 
Russia’s borders – especially the enlargement of the “military infrastructure” 
17 Besides, economic factors are likely to have mattered.
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– is not connected in any way “with the democratic choices of individual 
states” (Putin 2007). Putin even speaks about a “containment” of Russia 
by the West: “They are constantly trying to sweep us into a corner” (Putin 
2014a; Putin 2014b). The eastward enlargement of NATO seems to be 
understood by Russia as a “serious provocation” (Putin 2007). Against these 
official statements by Putin – and thus against the thesis that Russia classes 
NATO as the “main threat” – reorganization of Russian forces is argued 
(Eitelhuber 2015: 218): Russia did not prefer a “large mobilization army” 
and the “Western military district” was not “strengthened,” but Moscow 
enhanced its “special forces,” which are “specialized in asymmetric 
warfare and fighting against terrorism” (ibid.). Yes, Russia did indeed 
reject NATO’s eastward enlargement. The significance of this (bygone) 
expansion, however, has, in reference to the Russian behaviour in Ukraine 
since 2014, little relevance. If Moscow had rated its security at such risk 
because of NATO’s eastward expansion, Russia would have adjusted its 
military power according to this threat. That seems not to be the case. 
Moreover, there are five years between NATO’s latest enlargement and 
Russia’s course of action in the Ukrainian crisis (NATO 2015). McFaul’s 
conclusions illustrate this: “[F]or the previous several years” NATO did not 
expand towards the East (McFaul 2014: 169; Dunay 2014: 59).
The following section will evaluate how endangered Russia judged its 
security in relation to NATO’s missile defence system: Back in 2007, Putin 
had cautioned against an “arms race” initiated by the Western missile 
defence shield (Putin 2007). This missile defence shield poses a threat to 
Russian security, because it “neutralizes” entirely “the possible threat” of 
Moscow’s “nuclear forces” (Putin 2007; Putin 2014b). As Russia’s “second-
strike capability” is nullified by this system (Dickow et al. 2016: 6), accordingly 
“the ultimate guarantee” of Russian “sovereignty” is in danger (Eitelhuber 
2015: 220). As a consequence, NATO’s missile defence system can be 
rated as the actual “main threat” to Russia (Eitelhuber 2015: 220).19  What’s 
more, Russia feels “cheated” by NATO, because NATO had “lied” “many 
times” to Moscow.20
19 Although the termination of the “ABM treaty” by the “USA in 2002” increased the Russian “security concerns”,  the aim 
of the contract was to limit “missile defense systems” (Hacke 2014: 41).
20 In this regard, Putin refers to NATO’s eastward enlargement and to the missile defense system. Harald Müller speaks 
about “vocal promises” that have been “broken” (Müller 2015: 310). Klaus von Beyme, on the other hand, doubts 
“such a commitment” (Beyme 2016: 56, 73). NATO also denies this: “No such pledge was made […]” (NATO 2014).
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Because Russia rejects NATO’s eastward enlargement, this could also be 
the case concerning membership of Ukraine in the Western defensive 
alliance, which Russia might have tried to prevent. In fact, Russia clearly 
rejected such an extension of NATO to Ukraine: “[W]e are against having 
a military alliance making itself at home right in our backyard or in our 
historic territory” (Putin 2014a). Ukraine’s accession to NATO is generally 
regarded as “unacceptable” by the Russian elite (Mearsheimer 2014: 
82). Above all, Putin feared the consequences of NATO’s accession to 
Ukraine, in reference to Crimea and the port city of Sevastopol (Putin 
2014a): “NATO’s navy would be right there in this city of Russia’s military 
glory, and this would create not an illusory but a perfectly real threat to the 
whole of southern Russia” (Putin 2014a). In addition, it is possible that Putin 
expected, with regard to the accession of Ukraine to NATO, the arrival 
of a NATO naval base in Crimea (Mearsheimer 2014: 77). Russia seemed 
to try to counter a further expansion of the Western military power. This 
had already been demonstrated by the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, in 
which it was Russia’s intention to terminate “Georgia’s progress towards 
NATO membership” (Kriendler 2014: 90; Zellner 2015: 92–93, 96). This can be 
transferred to Ukraine, because it is unlikely that a state “which is involved 
in military conflicts” can join NATO (Maćków 2015: 109). It could be alleged 
that Russia has adopted a strategy in which it pursues “nonintegration” 
into the West and a destabilization of “territories, which [...] [it] can directly 
or indirectly control” (Meister 2015: 4).21
In spite of all this, it is necessary to check whether the accession of Ukraine 
to NATO was (at all) probable. In the period from 2002 to 2008, Ukraine “tried 
four times to be included in the action plan for NATO membership,” but 
this was prevented by the Germans and French (Göler 2015: 294; Umbach 
2004: 309–310). Nevertheless, Michael McFaul notes: “For the last several 
years, neither the Ukrainian government nor NATO members wanted Kiev 
to join the alliance anytime soon” (McFaul 2014: 169; Sestanovich 2014: 
172). And even before Yanukovich’s reign, this was the case (McFaul 
2014: 169; Dunay 2014: 59). An admittance of Ukraine into NATO is thus to 
be regarded as unlikely (Eitelhuber 2015: 315).22 On the basis of a NATO 
document from the year 2015, however, the NATO summit in Bucharest in 
21  This is illustrated by the examples of “Syria, North Korea and Iran,” where it is not certain “to what extent Russia” is 
interested “in a final solution of conflicts at all” (Klein 2015b: 46).
22  McFaul confirms that during his legislature under US President Obama, he “cannot remember” that NATO expansion 
was ever on the political agenda (McFaul 2014: 168–169).
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2008 officially announced different resolutions:
Allied leaders […] agreed at Bucharest that Georgia and Ukraine, 
which were already engaged in intensified dialogues with NATO, 
will one day become members. In December 2008, Allied foreign 
ministers decided to enhance opportunities for assisting the two 
countries in efforts to meet membership requirements […] (NATO 
2015).
In 2008, the members of NATO formulated clearly their will “that these 
countries will become members of NATO” (NATO 2008). Although no 
specific timetable for the accession of Ukraine has been established, 
this may not be impossible. On the contrary, a bulk of NATO members 
wanted it. And also Ukraine’s relations with NATO were further intensified 
(NATO 2008; NATO 2016b). Nevertheless, the “chaotic” manner of Russia 
points more to a “spontaneous reaction” to Yanukovich’s fall and not to a 
long-planned strategy for the avoidance of NATO’s expansion to Ukraine 
(Treisman 2016: 48).
It could be worked out that the Russian behaviour (probably) was not 
a reaction to “NATO’s long-ago expansion” (McFaul 2014: 170). Indeed, 
there is no doubt that the eastward expansion of NATO was “a key and 
persistent irritant in NATO-Russia relations” and that the Russian leadership 
regarded it as a threat to its security (Kriendler 2014: 89; Beyme 2016: 
56; Putin 2007). However, with regard to the Ukrainian crisis, NATO’s 
eastward enlargement cannot be called the “taproot of the trouble.” 
Nevertheless, Russia clearly saw (and sees) its security threatened by the 
NATO missile defence system. It is possible to prove Moscow’s goal of 
preventing Ukrainian membership in NATO, and thereby a further gain of 
military power by the West. Still, Russian behaviour can only be partially 
justified by a preventive necessity of Russia in order to “prevent a possible 
further expansion of NATO” (Beyme 2016: 56),23 because an accession 
of Ukraine, although desired by NATO, did not occur in the foreseeable 
future. Overall, Russia seems to have targeted a “marginal position 
improvement and [...] symbolic-emotional satisfaction” (Müller 2015: 312). 
The Russian elite still felt “betrayed” by NATO (Putin 2014a). In particular, 
NATO’s missile defence has further strengthened the “Russian feeling of 
23 And yet Beyme speaks about an “escape [of Russia] into an expansion policy to prevent NATO from spreading to 
Crimea” (Beyme 2016: 90).
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encirclement” (Eitelhuber 2015: 222). Hypothesis H2 can be partially, but 
not clearly, verified by empiricism.
Western economic and political dominance: 
expansion of the European Union
This section analyses whether Russia reacted to the extension of the 
European Union by annexing Crimea and destabilizing eastern Ukraine. 
As NATO is militarily superior to Russia, the EU outclasses Russia in economic 
respects (Weidenfeld 2015: 205; Maćków 2015: 13–14): Through its 
enlargement, the EU has steadily expanded its economic power and its 
population. It should be stated that Russia has feared a weakening of its 
own economic and political power, because of the expansion of the EU.
However, the eastward enlargement of the EU seems not to have been 
criticized by Russia “for years” (Maćków 2015: 18; Zellner 2015: 93). However, 
in 2004, Putin said about the EU’s eastward enlargement that it contributed 
to a rapprochement between the EU and Russia, “not only geographically 
but also economically and mentally” (Wipperfürth 2011: 41). And also 
at the security conference in 2007, Putin spoke of “spheres in which we 
cooperate” with regard to the EU, which he altogether appreciated as 
“very important and very interesting” (Putin 2007). Moscow’s worry about 
a weakening of its own economic and political power, as a result of the 
eastward enlargement of the EU, cannot be demonstrated in this respect. 
In general, Russia seems to regard the European Union as “a politically 
acceptable, stabilizing and mediating force” (Ehrhart 2010: 121).
This could also be true about the European Neighbourhood Policy, which 
cannot be said to “prepare the countries in between [...] for membership 
in the Union,” since there is “no incentive” for this (Maćków 2015: 108). 
However, with its European Neighbourhood Policy, the EU is striving to 
strengthen “civil society organizations” and thus a democratic civil society 
(European Commission 2013: 19–21). “Democratic development,” and 
thus “constitutionality,” “human rights” and “civil society,” have top priority 
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(ibid.). The spread of these norms can be regarded as a (political) threat 
to Putin’s regime in Russia, because Putin is fighting precisely against these 
elements in his own country (Chodorkowskij 2016: 8). Moreover, it is in the 
interest of Moscow to keep Ukraine in its “political and cultural influence,” 
which seems to be incompatible with “system reforms” or accession to 
the EU (Maćków 2015: 10).
The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement was, in fact, opposed by Russia 
as it threatened “the integration interests” of Russia’s Eurasian Economic 
Union (Maćków 2015: 68). In this respect, “there would have been no 
dialogue” with Russia at all (Putin 2014b). The “massive pressure” of Russia 
against the agreement, which finally prevented the signing (Göler 2015: 
300), demonstrates the Russian ambition to prevent a rapprochement 
between Ukraine and the EU. Russia’s concern for its economy is clear: 
“[It] is not about Ukraine’s sovereign choice but about the consequences 
it will have on the Russian economy if it is signed” (Putin 2014c). While Putin 
emphasized cooperation with the EU at the EU-Russia meeting in January 
2014, he simultaneously demanded,
to link the European and Eurasian integration processes. I am 
convinced that there are no contradictions between the two 
models […] they could effectively complement each other and 
contribute to the growth of mutual trade turnover (Putin 2014c).
Nevertheless, it has been the EU that has delayed a “rapid integration” 
of Ukraine (into the EU) (Göler 2015: 294). The signing of the agreement 
has already been postponed by the European side as the “human rights 
situation” in Ukraine deteriorated (Göler 2015: 298). It was therefore not 
possible to expect an accession of Ukraine to the EU within the near future 
(Zellner 2015: 97). A further political and economic approach, on the other 
hand, took place, and Russia tried to prevent this. The Russian perspective 
on the EU has changed, especially in the last few years. Russia’s own 
economic motives may be viewed as the (main) motive. Russia saw its 
own economic power increasingly endangered. Hypothesis H3 can, for 
the most part (though not clearly), be confirmed.
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXIII (80) - 2017
277
Russian crisis on the domestic front: creation of a 
foreign policy enemy stereotype
Now it is necessary to investigate whether the Russian leadership, centred 
around Putin, tried to strengthen its legitimacy in its own country. This can 
be achieved by the externalization of the domestic political crisis. It is 
therefore necessary to prove if an enemy image was created – which 
Russia claims to fight (militarily) in Ukraine. The fact that it was necessary 
for the political leadership of Russia to divert internal political grievances 
through an externalization of an enemy stereotype can be substantiated. 
Putin has “feared” protests in Russia, particularly against the background 
of the “Orange Revolution in 2004” in Ukraine and the “Arab Spring” 
(McFaul 2014: 170).24 The Ukrainian Maidan was also “highly dangerous” 
for Putin’s regime (Quiring 2014: 16).25 That the domestic political crisis 
was viewed by the Russian leadership as a serious threat has been proven.
Michael McFaul considers this domestic “attack” on “Putin and his regime” 
to be decisive for the change in Russian foreign policy (McFaul 2014: 169). 
Consequently, Putin seemed to have established an enemy stereotype of 
the West, especially with regard to the United States, in order to mobilize 
his “electoral base” in Russia (Mc Faul 2014: 170; Schröder 2014: 9). In fact, 
Putin and his foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, at the end of 2014, accused 
the West of refusing a “dialogue,” and both blamed the West for being 
co-responsible for the “coup” in Ukraine (Putin 2014b; Lawrow 2014). The 
Western sanctions against Russia Putin labels as a “containment,” which 
would have taken place even without the events in Ukraine (Putin 2014b). 
Moreover, “some Western politicians” “threaten” Russia “not only with 
sanctions” but also with “the prospect of increasingly serious problems 
on the domestic front” (Putin 2014a). In his speech, Putin further asks: “[A]
re they hoping to put us in a worsening social and economic situation 
so as to provoke public discontent?” (Putin 2014a). This seems to reflect 
the fact that Putin blames the West for the domestic political problems 
of Russia. Putin also criticizes the West: “Our Western partners, led by the 
24 In the course of the so-called “color revolutions,” Russia preferred “stability and the status quo” in the states – in 
contrast to the West (Cross 2017: 39).
25 Putin’s words from 2014 can be interpreted as a warning to the Russian people: The “series of controlled ´color` 
revolutions” ultimately led to “chaos” and “violent outbreaks,” and not to “democracy and freedom” (Putin 2014a). 
And a similar picture is emerging in Ukraine (Putin 2014a).
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United States of America, prefer not to be guided by international law 
in their practical policies, but by the rule of the gun” (Putin 2014a). The 
construction of an enemy image of the West becomes particularly clear 
in this speech by Putin:
And all this while Russia strived to engage in dialogue with our 
colleagues in the West. […] [T]here is a limit to everything. […] 
[T]hey were fully aware that there are millions of Russians living 
in Ukraine and in Crimea. They must have really lacked political 
instinct […] not to foresee all the consequences of their actions. 
Russia found itself in a position it could not retreat from (Putin 
2014a).
Thus, Putin accuses the Western states of influencing Ukraine: “[W]ith 
Ukraine, our Western partners have crossed the line, playing the bear and 
acting irresponsibly” (Putin 2014a). Accordingly, the West would support 
a “well-equipped army of militants” in Ukraine, and such actions would 
be “against Ukraine and Russia and against Eurasian integration” (Putin 
2014a).
It is now necessary to prove whether Putin achieved an internal cohesion 
in Russia through this externalization of the domestic political crisis in Russia. 
In fact, the literature points out that Putin has regained “legitimacy among 
the [Russian] population” by annexing Crimea (Meister 2015: 2; Schröder 
2014: 9). By defying the West in Ukraine, Putin’s “support” seems to have 
risen in Russia (Cross 2017: 41). This is also confirmed by Putin’s approval 
ratings. The ratings were “at least under 50 percent” at the beginning of 
2012, and actually since the annexation of Crimea they seem to have 
“increased to 80 per cent” (Maćków 2015: 66). Other sources point out 
that Putin’s approval ratings have already stabilized since the (domestic) 
crisis in Russia at the end of 2011 and early 2012, and reached almost 70 
percent in December 2012 (BpB 2014). However, by January 2014, the 
approval had fallen to about 60 percent, before it increased continuously 
from February 2014 onwards to more than 75 percent (ibid.).
Thus, it can be assumed that the Putin regime had a stabilizing effect 
on the domestic front, because of the annexation of Crimea and the 
destabilization of eastern Ukraine. “Own internal cohesion” in Russia seems 
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to have been achieved, at least for the time being, and the formation of 
the enemy stereotype can be regarded as successful. While “38 percent” 
of Russians had a “negative” picture of the US in 2013, it was “71 percent” 
in 2014 (Sputnik 2014). It could be shown that Russia claims to fight the 
Western enemy in Ukraine, which is blamed by the Russian leadership for 
the bad domestic situation in Russia. Russia seems to combat militarily the 
enemy image of the West in Ukraine, both in the east of the country and 
in Crimea. Overall, Hypothesis H4 was confirmed.
Conclusions
The analysis shows that with the Russian naval base in Crimea, at least the 
annexation of this – and the port city of Sevastopol – by Russia can be 
explained. The analysis of Russia maintaining its military strength, at the 
analytical level of the state, was particularly revealing.
On the other hand, the expansion of NATO and the EU appears to (partly) 
explain Russian behaviour. In both cases, the Russian course of action 
was not clearly explained by the eastward enlargement of both Western 
institutions. In addition, Ukrainian membership of NATO, in the near future, 
may be considered unlikely. With regard to the EU, it has only been in 
the last few years that Russia has worried more about its own economy 
and about its Eurasian Union. Accordingly, Russia tried to prevent further 
economic and political rapprochement between Ukraine and the EU. 
Overall, the results of the analysis at the level of the system were less clear.
The construction of an enemy image of the West could be demonstrated. 
This, in fact, seems to serve to project domestic mischief to the outside. For 
the time being, this attempt by the Russian leadership may be described 
as successful. The hypothesis can be confirmed quite clearly.
Further steps by Russia, in the sense of an extension of its territory, cannot 
be ruled out, but they seem to be unlikely. With its aggressive behaviour, 
Russia has first of all certainly achieved one thing: The West has also 
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experienced an increased “internal cohesion” (Maćków 2015: 98). The 
European states, although faced with internal political challenges, are 
increasing their military spending – and NATO is experiencing a “new right 
to exist” (Lukjanow 2016).
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